Assad turned his back on Erdogan’s offer of cooperation – and has now paid a heavy price. In the hours leading up to Assad’s December 8 ouster, as rebels – led by Islamist group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – closed in on the Syrian capital, Erdogan said he made an offer to the longtime Syrian strongman.
“We reached out to Assad, saying, ‘Come, let us determine the future of Syria together’. Unfortunately, we did not get a positive response.”
Erdogan, as the main backer of some of the rebel forces then sweeping through Syria, knew his adversary had just sealed his fate.
Read moreKey points on the rebel gains that reignited Syria’s civil war
As Syria plunges into a period of great uncertainty, Turkey could be emerging as the big regional winner after the fall of Assad. And Ankara has a vested interest in what happens in Syria, given that the two countries share a more than 900-kilometre-long border.
Erdogan is determined to keep the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) – which he sees as an offshoot of the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) – out of the picture. The PKK is listed as a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.
Just a day after Assad’s overthrow, Turkish-backed rebels announced they had taken control of the northern Syrian town of Manbij from the US-backed, and predominantly Kurdish, Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Meanwhile, Turkey is still hosting almost 3 million Syrian refugees whose presence has become a hot political issue for Erdogan at home.
Didier Billion, deputy director of the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (Iris) and an expert on Turkey and the Middle East, spoke to FRANCE 24.
FRANCE 24: What role did Turkey play in the rebels’ flash offensive?
Didier Billion: Turkey was, of course, aware. Since 2017, Turkey has had around 15,000 troops stationed in Idlib province. This was a decision taken by the Astana Process group (Russia, Iran and Turkey). Turkey had fairly fluid, almost daily, exchanges with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), even though their objectives and ideologies are not the same. The preparation of this lightning advance, which took everyone by surprise, was no secret: Turkish intelligence services knew about it. The Turks had at least tacitly accepted it.
The Syrian National Army (SNA) – which is only an army in name, as it is a collection of disparate groups – is armed, managed and organised by Turkey. And for 10 days, the SNA has fought on the same side as HTS. They even divided tasks because they weren’t on the same battlefields. This is yet more evidence that Turkey knew what was going on. But that does not mean that HTS is subservient to Turkey.
What is Turkey’s plan for the Kurds, especially considering the SDF has now taken control of Manbij?
Erdogan’s long-standing plan for several years has been to secure the border. He wants to create a type of security cordon along the whole Syrian-Turkish border. Why? Because he doesn’t want a “terrorist entity” present on the Turkish border. He is obviously referring to the zones controlled by the People’s Protection Units, the YPG, which Ankara considers to be an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party. Erdogan’s goal is to expand the so-called security zone. The border between Turkey and Syria is very long: 928 kilometres (577 miles). For the time being, a few hundred kilometres are controlled by the Turkish army. Erdogan will use the current situation – and these fast-evolving developments – to try to expand the zones the Turkish army controls. The goal is to push the Kurdish groups as far south as possible and retake Manbij. Turkey is taking advantage of the general chaos that is reigning.
The question is whether, in the coming days or weeks, the new government in Damascus will be on the same wavelength, or if it will instead adopt a more inclusive approach and integrate the Kurds into its government. I think the new government is more likely to let Turkey have its way. The risk is that Syria will be partitioned – into a Kurdish zone, an Alawite zone and a Druze zone…
No one knows what (HTS leader) Abu Mohammed al-Golani will do. We have to wait until he actually takes office and makes a grand speech to get some answers. So Turkey is pushing its pawns forward, taking advantage of the situation in the short term. It’s one of the winners in the current crisis, but in the medium term, we have to remain cautious.
Read moreHTS rebel group sweeping Syria tries to shed its jihadist image
Will Erdogan send Syrian refugees home?
After the Kurds, the Syrian refugees represent the second biggest issue for Erdogan. A few years ago, there were between 3.6 and 3.8 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. That’s a huge number. But we have to remember that Syrians don’t enjoy refugee status under international law. They are hosted. Even though Turkey’s hosting of Syrian refugees has gone fairly smoothly for several years, the refugee question became a hot-button domestic issue during the 2023 presidential and legislative elections. Erdogan needs to take this into account, and will undoubtedly try to send as many of them as he can back to Syria, as soon as he can. But not all of them, because that would be mission impossible. There are still more than 3 million refugees in Turkey, and many of them are still too afraid to return to Syria. At the moment, we’re seeing scenes of celebration, people dancing in the streets and so on. But I think that pretty quickly they will become disillusioned.
Read moreThe road to Damascus: Syrian exiles return home to celebrate the fall of Assad
Many refugees want to return home to their families, but many of them will decide to wait until the situation is stabilised. Others will choose to stay in Turkey because they have roots there now. But tens, if not hundreds, of thousands are very likely to return to Syria.
How do you think relations with Russia will develop?
For about two years now, Erdogan has tried to mend ties with Assad. There have been a number of public demands and many envoys have probably been sent to Damascus on secret reconciliation missions. The Russians have been very supportive of Turkish ambitions. But Assad has been in some sort of denial of reality. He didn’t even listen to the Russians even though they saved him back in 2015. He made a headlong rush, and closed himself in. By conducting realpolitik, the Russians and the Turks managed to get along in the Group of 7 even though they were on different sides.
Today, the Russians and the Turks are moving very much in the same direction, but there is one important difference: Although Russia used to play a very important role [in Syria], it’s on the losing side now. So the big question is what will happen to Russian military bases. Russia will probably have to leave the smaller ones, but the key question is what will happen with the Tartus base on the Mediterranean coast. Will Syria’s new government accept a continued Russian presence there? I doubt it, even if they won’t be made to leave overnight. There will be negotiations. If the Russians have to leave Tartus, it will represent a major strategic defeat for them. If they want to stay, they will have to offer something in exchange. It’s useless to play fictional politics; the situation in Syria will be unstable in the coming weeks.
So is Turkey the big regional winner here?
In the short term, there’s no question about it. [Turkey] is proving, once again, that it can’t be ignored. It’s in the process of pushing the Kurds south. This is very important for Turkey strategically. But what happens next will depend on the new Syrian leadership. Do they want to negotiate a deal with Turkey? The factual elements we have today tend to point in that direction. What kind of power will they install? What rights will Kurds have in the new Syria? Will it be a super-strict regime, or a regime that is able to compromise? I don’t have the answer to that.
This article has been translated from the original in French.
Leave a Comment